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=Welcome to the Experimental Philosophy Wiki=
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=Good News! The Experimental Philosophy Page has moved to: www.experimentalphilosophy.org/wiki=
[[Image:Xphi chair.jpg|thumb|The Philosopher's Armchair]]
 
Philosophers often make claims about people’s intuitions regarding particular cases. Experimental philosophy aims to put these claims to the test using standard empirical methods.<ref>[http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/experimentalphilosophy.html Online Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind]</ref>
 
 
If you want to learn about Experimental Philosophy, you can read more [http://www.hum.utah.edu/philosophy/faculty/nichols/Papers/FolkconceptsFinal.htm here], [http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/ExperimentalPhilosophy.pdf here] and [http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779329332&fulltext=713240928 here].
 
 
'''How To Use This Site'''
 
#Add your own papers to the section in which it best fits (or any other papers which have yet to be included). Please link all papers if possible. If there is not already an appropriate section, you can place it under [[#Miscellaneous Papers|Miscellaneous Papers]] or create a new heading for a group of papers.
 
# Feel free to add any new links (e.g. to a blog related to experimental philosophy) or create any new pages you think are needed (e.g. Experimental Philosophers). Only check to make sure a similar page doesn't already exist and add it to the list of [[#X-Phi Wiki Pages|X-Phi wiki pages]].
 
#Continue the revolution.
 
 
----
 
 
__TOC__
 
 
==Papers on Causation==
 
 
[http://www.duke.edu/~spl3/The%20vernacular%20concept%20of%20innateness.PDF Jonathan Livengood & Edouard Machery (2007). The Folk Probably Don't Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107–127.]
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/Knobe-Fraser.pdf Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser (2008). Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology. MIT Press.]
 
<blockquote>It has long been known that people’s causal judgments can have an impact on their moral judgments. To take a simple example, if people conclude that a behavior caused the death of ten innocent children, they will therefore be inclined to regard the behavior itself as morally wrong. So far, none of this should come as any surprise. But recent experimental work points to the existence of a second, and more surprising, aspect of the relationship between causal judgment and moral... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/causation-hps.pdf Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Folk Judgments of Causation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.]
 
<blockquote>When scientists are trying to uncover the causes of a given outcome, they often make use of statistical information. Thus, if scientists wanted to know whether there was a causal relationship between attending philosophy lectures and learning philosophy, they might randomly assign students to either attend or not attend certain lectures and then check to see whether those who attended the lectures ended up learning more philosophy than those who did not. </blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Consciousness==
 
 
[http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=943 Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.]
 
<blockquote>When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004074/ Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery (2009). “How to study Folk Intuitions about Phenomenal Consciousness.” ''Philosophical Psychology'', 22(1): 21-35.]
 
<blockquote>The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004438/ Justin Sytsma (forthcoming). “Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness.” ''Philosophy of Science'', 76(5), December 2009.]
 
<blockquote>Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? A growing body of researchers not only hold that it is, but that its very existence is a deep mystery. Perhaps not surprisingly, that this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted. It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible... </blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Cross-Cultural Differences in Intuitions==
 
[http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/NEI/NEIPT.html Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics, 29, 429-460.]
 
<blockquote>In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/SemanticIntuitions.pdf Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. 2004. “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style.” Cognition, 92, B1-B12.]
 
<blockquote>Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://faculty.baruch.cuny.edu/hsarkissian/ChinaPhenomenal083008.pdf Bryce Huebner, Mike Bruno, and Hagop Sarkissian. forthcoming. "What does the nation of China think of phenomenal states?"'' European Journal of Philosophy''.]
 
 
[http://faculty.vassar.edu/balam/arecantonesespeakersreallydescriptivists.pdf Barry Lam, Are Cantonese Speakers Really Descriptivists? Revisiting Cross-Cultural Semantics.]
 
<blockquote>In an article in Cognition, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [Machery et al., 2004] present data which purports to show that “East Asian” native Cantonese speakers tend to have descriptivist intuitions about the referents of proper names, while “Western” native English speakers tend to have causal-historical intuitions about proper names. Machery et al take this finding to support the view that some intuitions, the universality of which they claim is central to philosophical theories, vary according to cultural background... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/papers/Against%20Arguments%20from%20Reference%20machery.pdf Eduoard Machery, Mallon, R., Nichols, S. & S. Stich (web). Against Arguments From Reference. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics. Oxford University Press.]
 
 
==Papers on Epistemology==
 
 
[http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/NEI/NEIPT.html Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions" Philosophical Topics, 29 (2001): 429-460]
 
 
[http://www.blackwell-compass.com/subject/philosophy/article_view?article_id=phco_articles_bpl048 Joshua Alexander and Jonathan M. Weinberg, "Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy" Philosophy Compass, 2(2007): 56-80]
 
<blockquote>It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a792861775~db=all~order=page Adam Feltz, "Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology," Philosophical Explorations, 11(2008): 131-141]
 
<blockquote>George Bealer argues that intuitions are not only reliable indicators of truth, they are necessary to the philosophical endeavor. Specifically, he thinks that intuitions are essential sources of evidence for epistemic justification. I argue that Bealer’s defense of intuitions either (1) is insufficient to show that actual human beings are in a position to use intuitions for epistemic justification, or (2) begs the question. The growing empirical data about our intuitions support the view that humans are not creatures appropriately positioned to use intuitions for epistemic justification in the way Bealer suggests. Without the appropriate empirical evidence that humans are beings so positioned, his view begs the question against those who think that intuitions are not reliable guides to truth.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://faculty.schreiner.edu/adfeltz/Papers/Know%20more.pdf Adam Feltz and Chris Zarpentine, "Do You Know More When It Matters Less?" Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)]
 
<blockquote>According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential (or epistemic) features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential (or epistemic) features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's predictions about ordinary knowledge ascriptions are false. If we are right, then arguments for anti-intellectualism which rely on ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail. Our aim in this paper is to argue that the case for anti-intellectualism cannot depend on our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.joshdmay.com/wp-content/media/kpi-xphi.pdf Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull, and Aaron Zimmerman, "Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study" European Review of Philosophy, special issue on Psychology and Experimental Philosophy (forthcoming)]
 
<blockquote>In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these results, one must develop a better conception of the connection between a subject's interests and her body of knowledge than those offered by Stanley and Schaffer.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/Metaskept.htm Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich and Jonathan M. Weinberg, "Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology" In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247]
 
<blockquote>Throughout the twentieth century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments, whose origins can be traced back to Descartes, played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, including Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers (for example Cohen 1999; DeRose 1995; Hill 1996; Klein 1981; Lewis 1996; McGinn 1993; Nozick 1981; Schiffer 1996; Unger 1975; Williams 1991). Typically, these arguments make use of one or more premises which the philosophers proposing them take to be intuitively obvious. Beyond an appeal to intuition, little or no defence is offered, and in many cases it is hard to see what else could be said in support of these premises...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.indiana.edu/~eel/The%20Instability%20of%20Philosophical%20Intuitions_PPR.pdf Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg, "The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)]
 
<blockquote>A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.indiana.edu/~eel/Challenge%20Intuitions.pdf Jonathan M. Weinberg, "How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism" Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31 (2007): 318-343]
 
<blockquote>Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent to which we possess a good capacity for the detection and correction of the errors of any fallible source of evidence. I argue that we should not trust putative sources of evidence that are substantially lacking in hopefulness (even if they are basically reliable), and that we are indeed already operating under such a norm in our ordinary and scientific practices. I argue further that the philosophical practice of the appeal to intuitions is, in these terms, badly hopeless...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.fsu.edu/~philo/A%20Stich%20in%20Time.pdf Michael Bishop, "Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity: Does a Stich in Time Save Quine?" in D. Murphy & M. Bishop (eds), Stephen Stich and His Critics (Blackwell, in press)]
 
<blockquote>In “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine famously suggests that epistemology, properly understood, “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, 82). Since the appearance of Quine’s seminal article, virtually every epistemologist, including the later Quine (1986, 664), has repudiated the idea that a normative discipline like epistemology could be reduced to a purely descriptive discipline like psychology. Working epistemologists no longer take Quine’s vision in “Epistemology Naturalized” seriously. In this paper, I will explain why I think this is a mistake. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Stephen Stich published a number of works that criticized analytic epistemology and defended a pragmatic view of cognitive assessment (1985, 1988, 1990, 1993). In the past five years, Stich, Jonathan Weinberg and Shaun Nichols (henceforth, WNS) have put forward a number of empirically-based arguments criticizing epistemology in the analytic tradition (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2001; Nichols, Stich and Weinberg 2003). My thesis is that the most powerful features of Stich’s epistemological views vindicate Quine’s now moribund naturalism. I expect this thesis to be met with incredulity – not least from Stich, who has explicitly argued that the reductionist view standardly attributed to Quine is a non-starter (1993, 3-5).</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jbeebe2/Beebe%20Buckwalter%20ESEE.pdf James Beebe and Wesley Buckwalter, "The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect" (under review)]
 
<blockquote>Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It is further argued that these findings, while preliminary, have important implications for recent debates within epistemology about the relationship between knowledge and action.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jbeebe2/Buckwalter%20Knowledge%20on%20Saturdays.pdf Wesley Buckwalter, "Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturdays" (under review)]
 
<blockquote>Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding the knowledge practices of normal agents in everyday speech. Proposed is a set of experiments designed to test for the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, experiments indicate that the contextualist pattern of knowledge attribution does not obtain among ordinary speakers. These results, while preliminary, inspire prima facie skepticism for the contextualist hypothesis regarding knowledge claims, as well as challenge certain predictions made by recent theories of subject-sensitive invariantism. It is further argued that these findings raise methodological questions concerning the practice of parlaying an assumption of intuitions, with respect to ordinary language practices, into philosophical conclusions regarding knowledge.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/home/mphelan/Evidence.pdf Ram Neta and Mark Phelan, "Evidence that Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence" (under review)]
 
<blockquote>Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge, justification, or evidence. In this paper, we assess anti-intellectualism about evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. We show that intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not even come close to displaying the pattern that the anti-intellectualist about evidence thinks they display: In fact, those data tell strongly against such anti-intellectualism. Nonetheless, we show, peoples’ intuitive judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism about evidence...</blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Experimental Philosophy==
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/ExperimentalPhilosophy.pdf Joshua Knobe. "What Is Experimental Philosophy" from ''The Philosophers’ Magazine'']
 
<blockquote>Since the earliest days of analytic philosophy, it has been a common practice to appeal to intuitions about particular cases. Typically, the philosopher presents a hypothetical situation and then makes a claim of the form: ‘In this case, we would surely say....’ This claim about people’s intuitions then forms a part of an argument for some more general theory about the nature of our concepts or our use of language. One puzzling aspect of this practice is that it so rarely... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.hum.utah.edu/philosophy/faculty/nichols/Papers/FolkconceptsFinal.htm Shaun Nichols. (2004) "Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science" from ''Trends in Cognitive Science'']
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/JCCResponses.pdf Joshua Knobe & Arudra Burra (2006). Experimental Philosophy and Folk Concepts: Methodological Considerations. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):331-342.]
 
<blockquote>Experimental philosophy is a comparatively new field of research, and it is only natural that many of the key methodological questions have not even been asked, much less answered. In responding to the comments of our critics, we therefore find ourselves brushing up against difficult questions about the aims and techniques of our whole enterprise. We will do our best to address these issues here, but the field is progressing at a rapid clip, and we suspect that it will be... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.appiah.net/images/APA_Lecture_2007_for_Web.pdf Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experimental Philosophy.]
 
<blockquote>Some three score years ago, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess found himself dissatisfied with “what are called ‘theories of truth’ in philosophical literature.” “The discussion has already lasted some 2500 years,” he wrote. “The number of participants amounts to a thousand, and the number of articles and books devoted to the discussion is much greater.” In this great ocean of words, he went on, the philosophers had often made bold statements about what “the man in the street” or “Das Volk"...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00050.x Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.]
 
<blockquote>Claims about people's intuitions have long played an important role in philosophical debates. The new field of experimental philosophy seeks to subject such claims to rigorous tests using the traditional methods of cognitive science – systematic experimentation and statistical analysis. Work in experimental philosophy thus far has investigated people's intuitions in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics. Although it is now generally agreed that experimental philosophers have made surprising discoveries about people's intuitions in each of these areas…</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/phil-significance.pdf Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):119 – 121.]
 
<blockquote>Kauppinen argues that experimental philosophy cannot help us to address questions about the semantics of our concepts and that it therefore has little to contribute to the discipline of philosophy. This argument raises fascinating questions in the philosophy of language, but it is simply a red herring in the present context. Most researchers in experimental philosophy were not trying to resolve semantic questions in the first place. Their aim was rather to address a more traditional sort of question, the sort... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a779329332&fulltext=713240928 Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias. (2007) "The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy" from ''Philosophical Explorations'' Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 123 – 149]
 
<blockquote>Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00133.x Paul E. Griffiths &amp; Karola Stotz (2008). Experimental Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):507–521.]
 
<blockquote>Experimental philosophy of science gathers empirical data on how key scientific concepts are understood by particular scientific communities. In this paper we briefly describe two recent studies in experimental philosophy of biology, one investigating the concept of the gene, the other the concept of innateness. The use of experimental methods reveals facts about these concepts that would not be accessible using the traditional method of intuitions about possible cases. It also contributes to the study of conceptual change in science, which...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335232 Thomas A. Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias, Polling as Pedagogy.]
 
<blockquote>First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the nascent field of "experimental philosophy," in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons' intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy-independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with the... </blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Folk Psychology==
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/bad-blame.pdf Joshua Knobe & Gabriel Mendlow (2004). The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:252-258.]
 
<blockquote>People ordinarily make sense of their own behavior and that of others by invoking concepts like belief, desire, and intention. Philosophers refer to this network of concepts and related principles as 'folk psychology.' The prevailing view of folk psychology among philosophers of mind and psychologists is that it is a proto-scientific theory whose function is to explain and predict behavior. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/science-morals.pdf Joshua Knobe (2007). Folk Psychology: Science and Morals. In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer Press.]
 
<blockquote>It is widely agreed that folk psychology plays an important role in people’s moral judgments. For a simple example, take the process by which we determine whether or not an agent is morally blameworthy. Although the judgment here is ultimately a moral one, it seems that one needs to use a fair amount of folk psychology along the way. Thus, one might determine that an agent broke the vase intentionally and therefore conclude that she is blameworthy for breaking it. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/ReasonExplanations.pdf Joshua Knobe (2007). Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.]
 
<blockquote>Consider the following explanation: (1) George took his umbrella because it was just about to rain. This is an explanation of a quite distinctive sort. It is profoundly different from the sort of explanation we might use to explain, say, the movements of a bouncing ball or the gradual rise of the tide on a beach. Unlike these other types of explanations, it explains an agent’s behavior by describing the agent’s own _reasons_ for performing that behavior. Explanations that work in…</blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Intentional Action==
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/folkconcept.html Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle (1997). The Folk Concept of Intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.]
 
<blockquote>When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://cogprints.org/3116/2/IntentionalAction.pdf Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.]
 
<blockquote>There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00481.x Joshua Knobe (2004). Intention, Intentional Action and Moral Considerations. Analysis 64 (2):181–187.]
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/meeks.pdf Roblin R. Meeks (2004). Unintentionally Biasing the Data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:220-223.]
 
<blockquote>Knobe (2003) wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect x was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one—simply elicit the intuitions of “The Folk” directly on the matter and record the results. His findings were a bit less obvious, however. When Knobe presented New York parkgoers with scenarios including either good or bad side effects, they tended to judge that the bad... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~content=a727334015~fulltext=713240930 Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.]
 
<blockquote>Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.udel.edu/Philosophy/papers/adams2006.pdf Fred Adams. (2006). Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 132-146.]
 
<blockquote>Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other language...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/PhilStudies.pdf Joshua Knobe. (2006). “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.]
 
<blockquote>It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/hindi.pdf Joshua Knobe (2006). The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):113-132.]
 
<blockquote>Recent studies point to a surprising divergence between people's use of the concept of _intention_ and their use of the concept of _acting intentionally_. It seems that people's application of the concept of intention is determined by their beliefs about the agent's psychological states whereas their use of the concept of acting intentionally is determined at least in part by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior itself (i.e., by their beliefs about whether the behavior is morally good... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/machery.pdf Edouard Machery (2006). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.]
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/NadelhofferExplorations.pdf Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2006). “Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems for juror impartiality.” Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):203 – 219.]
 
<blockquote>In this paper, I first review some of the recent empirical work on the biasing effect that moral considerations have on folk ascriptions of intentional action. Then, I use Mark Alicke's affective model of blame attribution to explain this biasing effect. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this research - both philosophical and psychological - to the problem of the partiality of jury deliberation. After all, if the immorality of an action does affect folk ascriptions of intentionality, and all serious... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.springerlink.com/index/M880337071188277.pdf Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). Desire, Foresight, Intentions, and Intentional Actions: Probing Folk Intuitions. Journal of Cognition and Culture.]
 
<blockquote>A number of philosophers working under the rubric of “experimental philosophy” have recently begun focusing on analyzing the concepts of ordinary language and investigating the intuitions of laypersons in an empirically informed way.1 In a series of papers these philosophers—who often work in collaboration with psychologists—have presented the results of empirical studies aimed at proving folk intuitions in areas as diverse as ethics, epistemology, free will, and the philosophy of action. In this paper, I contribute to this research program by... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/Feltz.pdf Adam Feltz (2007) The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 28, 265-277.]
 
<blockquote>Joshua Knobe (2003a) has discovered that the perceived goodness or badness of side effects of actions influences people's ascriptions of intentionality to those side effects. I present the paradigmatic cases that elicit what has been called the Knobe effect and offer some explanations of the Knobe effect. I put these explanations into two broad groups. One explains the Knobe effect by referring to our concept of intentional action. The other explains the Knobe effect without referring to our concept of intentional...</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00312.x Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski (2007). Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited. Mind and Language 22 (4):346–365.]
 
<blockquote>Recent work by Joshua Knobe indicates that people’s intuition about whether an action was intentional depends on whether the outcome is good or bad. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this effect is that there are stable individual differences in how ‘intentional’ is interpreted. That is, in Knobe’s cases, different people interpret the term in different ways. This interpretive diversity of ‘intentional’ opens up a new avenue to help explain Knobe’s results. Furthermore, the paper argues that the... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.princeton.edu/%7Eharman/Papers/Knobe-Burra.pdf Gilbert Harman, Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra.]
 
<blockquote>There has been considerable controversy about whether this last entailment always holds. Ordinary subjects may judge that (4) and (5) are appropriate in cases in which none of (1)-(3) are—cases in which Jack’s breaking the base is a foreseen but undesired consequence of Jack’s intentionally doing something else. It is currently debated what the best explanation of such ordinary reactions might be. It is also debated what to make of the fact that ordinary judgments using the adjective intentional or the... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://alelanteri.googlepages.com/Lanterietal2008_web.pdf Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini, and Salvatore Rizzello (2008). “An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem”. Journal of Business Ethics, 83 (4): 789-804.]
 
 
[http://www.hum.utah.edu/philosophy/faculty/mallon/Materials/ITO&MJfinal.pdf Ron Mallon (2008). Knobe Versus Machery: Testing the Trade-Off Hypothesis. Mind and Language 23 (2):247-255.]
 
<blockquote>Recent work by Joshua Knobe has established that people are far more likely to describe bad but foreseen side effects as intentionally performed than good but foreseen side effects (this is sometimes called the 'Knobe effect' or the 'side-effect effect.' Edouard Machery has proposed a novel explanation for this asymmetry: it results from construing the bad side effect as a cost that must be incurred to receive a benefit. In this paper, I argue that Machery's 'trade-off hypothesis' is wrong... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://faculty.baruch.cuny.edu/hsarkissian/The%20Folk%20Strike%20Back%20-%20PS.pdf Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2008). “The folk strike back: Or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it.” ''Philosophical Studies'', 138(2): 291-298.]
 
<blockquote>Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120120984/PDFSTART Frank Hindriks (2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry”. Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (233): 630-641.]
 
 
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997268/home Alessandro Lanteri (2009). “Elusive Lay Judgments of Intentionality and Moral Worth”. Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.]
 
 
[http://faculty.baruch.cuny.edu/hsarkissian/Trading%20for%20the%20Trade-Off%20Hypothesis.pdf Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2009). "Is the Trade-off Hypothesis worth trading for?" ''Mind &amp; Language'' 28(2): 164-80.]
 
<blockquote>Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work—the 'trade-off hypothesis'—which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://users.dickinson.edu/~nadelhth/Online%20Papers/Simple%20View%20Revise%20and%20Resubmit.pdf Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saving the Simple View.]
 
<blockquote>According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the ‘Simple View’(SV) (1984: 377), intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing (e.g., Adams 1986; McCann 1986; 1991). Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that it does not settle with our ordinary usage of the concept of intentional action (Knobe 2003a; 2003b; 2004). More specifically, it appears that in cases involving moral considerations, people are much more likely to judge that the action... </blockquote>
 
 
==Papers on Responsibility, Determinism, and Lay Intuitions==
 
[http://gfp.typepad.com/online_papers/files/is_incompatibilism_intuitive_for_ppr_prepub.doc Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer,and Jason Turner. (forthcoming). “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.]
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/Nichols-Knobe.pdf Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe. (2007). “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.” Noûs 41 (4):663–685.]
 
<blockquote>An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://gfp.typepad.com/online_papers/files/moral_cognition.doc Robert Woolfolk, John Doris, and John Darley. (forthcoming). “Attribution and Alternate Possibilities: Identification and Situational Constraint as Factors in Moral Cognition.” Cognition.]
 
 
[http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/mrvargas/Papers/PhilandFolk.pdf Manuel Vargas (2006) "Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work for Philosophical Debates on Free Will" The Journal of Cognition and Culture 6: 1 & 2, pp. 249-264]
 
 
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121647697/PDFSTART Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.]
 
<blockquote>In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://faculty.baruch.cuny.edu/hsarkissian/Is%20Belief%20in%20Free%20Will%20a%20Universal_final.pdf Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe De Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, Smita Sirker (forthcoming). "Is belief in free will a cultural universal?" ''Mind & Language'']
 
<blockquote>Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of participants said that... </blockquote>
 
 
==Miscellaneous Papers==
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/SPP.pdf Joshua Knobe (2005). Ordinary Ethical Reasoning and the Ideal of 'Being Yourself'. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):327 – 340.]
 
<blockquote>The psychological study of ethical reasoning tends to concentrate on a few specific issues, with the bulk of the research going to the study of people's attitudes toward moral rules or the welfare of others. But people's ethical reasoning is also shaped by a wide range of other concerns. Here I focus on the importance that people attach to the ideal of being yourself. It is shown that certain experimental results - results that seemed anomalous and inexplicable to researchers who... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/tics.pdf Joshua Knobe (2005). Theory of Mind and Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9:357-359.]
 
<blockquote>An extremely brief (3 page) review of recent work on the ways in which people's moral judgments can influence their use of folk-psychological concepts. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~amorton/PAPERS/Conceptology.pdf Adam Morton (2006). But Are They Right? The Prospects for Empirical Conceptology. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6.]
 
<blockquote>This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter – we or not too different creatures could have thought differently – which in principle can be…</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.indiana.edu/~eel/Reading%20Conflicted%20Minds%20preprint.pdf Chad Gonnerman, (2008) "Reading Conflicted Minds: An Empirical Follow-up to Knobe and Roedder," Philosophical Psychology, 21: 1-13]
 
<blockquote>Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this conclusion. I then propose the... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/Doing-Allowing.pdf Joshua Knobe, Fiery Cushman & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.]
 
<blockquote>An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3m33k8rj181v722/fulltext.pdf Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz (2008). The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire. Neuroethics 1 (2).]
 
<blockquote>In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has used findings in social psychology to put pressure on the claim that our moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified. More specifically, he has suggested that insofar as our moral intuitions are subject to what psychologists call framing effects, this poses a real problem for moral intuitionism. In this paper, we are going to try to add more fuel to the empirical fire that Sinnott-Armstrong has placed under the feet of the intuitionist... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/Freedom.pdf Jonathan Phillips & Joshua Knobe, (2009) Moral Judgments and Intuitions About Freedom. ''Psychological Inquiry.'']
 
<blockquote>Discussing voluntary and involuntary action, Aristotle suggests that certain actions may be neither completely voluntary nor completely involuntary, but instead have an intermediate character. He illustrates this point by considering the action of throwing goods overboard to ensure the safety of a ship and its crew during a life-threatening storm. We take up Aristotle's original example but pursue the answer in a slightly different way, asking instead if whether or not the action is considered voluntarily depends on the moral status of the action of throwing something overboard.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/pervasiveness.pdf Joshua Knobe & Dean Pettit, The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.]
 
<blockquote>Shows that the very same asymmetries that arise for intentionally also arise from deciding, desiring, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. It seems that the phenomenon is not due to anything about the concept of intentional action in particular. Rather, the effects observed for the concept of intentional action should be regarded as just one manifestation of the pervasive impact of moral judgment. </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/pkb_implicit.pdf Joshua Knobe, Paul Bloom & David Pizarro, College Students Implicitly Judge Interracial Sex and Gay Sex to Be Morally Wrong.]
 
<blockquote>College students implicitly judge interracial sex and gay sex to be morally wrong Some moral intuitions arise from psychological processes that are not fully accessible to consciousness. For instance, most people disapprove of consensual adult incest between siblings, but are unable to articulate why—they just feel that it is wrong (Haidt, 2001). More generally, there is evidence for at least two sources of moral judgment: explicit conscious reasoning and tacit intuitions, which are motivated by emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001)... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/%7Eknobe/Knobe-Doris.pdf Joshua Knobe & John Doris (forthcoming). Strawsonian Variations: Folk Morality and the Search for a Unified Theory. In John Doris & Et Al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology.]
 
<blockquote>Much of the agenda for contemporary philosophical work on moral responsibility was set by Strawson’s (1962) essay ‘Freedom and Resentment.’ In that essay, Strawson suggests that we focus not so much on metaphysical speculation as on understanding the actual practice of moral responsibility judgment. The hope is that we will be able to resolve the apparent paradoxes surrounding moral responsibility if we can just get a better sense of how this practice works and what role it serves in people’s lives... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004806/ Justin Sytsma (forthcoming). “The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Investigation.” ''Review of Philosophy and Psychology''.]
 
<blockquote>It is not uncommon for those engaged in the study of mind to react adversely to many of the claims coming out of the neuroscientific study of the brain. One prominent line of attack in these boundary disputes is that neuroscientists (often) misappropriate and misuse mentalistic vocabulary. In particular, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker (2003, 2007) have charged neuroscientists with committing the “mereological fallacy”; they claim that psychological predicates only apply to whole animals, that neuroscientists often apply them to other... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.smatthewliao.com/texts/liaointuitions.pdf Stefan Linquist, Paul Griffiths & Edouard Machery (forthcoming). The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. Mind and Language.]
 
<blockquote> ‘Inner natures’ of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of many of the existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why all such analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the vernacular concept or as explications of that concept for the... </blockquote>
 
 
 
[http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/papers/Folk%20concept%20of%20innateness_machery.pdf Edouard Machery (forthcoming). The Bleak Implications of Moral Psychology. Neuroethics.]
 
<blockquote>In Experiments in Ethics, Kwame Anthony Appiah examines the threats and promises that moral psychology (viz. the empirical study of our moral judgments and behaviors) carries for moral philosophy.2 Experiments in Ethics is a tour-de-force. Written in an elegant and engaging manner, it synthesizes a large amount of empirical knowledge about morality without sacrificing the acumen of the argumentation.3 Moral philosophers and moral psychologists sometimes suggest that the development of the empirical study of morality threatens the philosophical study of moral... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://users.dickinson.edu/~nadelhth/Online%20Papers/Fringe%20Benefits.pdf Thomas Nadelhoffer, Fringe Benefits, Side Effects, and Indifference: A Reply to Feltz.]
 
<blockquote>In a previous paper, I suggested that if an agent is a morally praiseworthy person and one of the consequences of the action she knowingly brings about is morally positive, then this consequence isn’t really a side effect for the agent. Adam Feltz has recently developed a case that purportedly puts pressure on my account of side effects. In the present paper, I am going to argue that Feltz’s purported counter-example fails to undermine my view even if it happens to... </blockquote>
 
 
==Critiques of Experimental Philosophy==
 
[http://www.helsinki.fi/~amkauppi/phil/The_Rise_and_Fall_of_Experimental_Philosophy.pdf Antti Kauppinen. (2007). The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations. 10: 95-118.]
 
<blockquote>In disputes about conceptual analysis, each side typically appeals to pre-theoretical 'intuitions' about particular cases. Recently, many naturalistically oriented philosophers have suggested that these appeals should be understood as empirical hypotheses about what people would say when presented with descriptions of situations, and have consequently conducted surveys on non-specialists. I argue that this philosophical research programme, a key branch of what is known as 'experimental philosophy', rests on mistaken assumptions about the relation between people's concepts and their linguistic behaviour…</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.smatthewliao.com/texts/liaointuitions.htm S. Matthew Liao. (2008). A Defense of Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247-262.]
 
<blockquote>Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on... </blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/ludwig/mws2007ludwig.pdf Kirk Ludwig. (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First vs. Third Person Approaches. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 31:128-159.]
 
 
[http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/Sosa.pdf Ernest Sosa. (2006). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies. 132:99-107.]
 
<blockquote>The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy. This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair intuitions as used in philosophy. </blockquote>
 
 
=Books=
 
[[Image:Experimental Philosophy Book Cover.jpg|thumb|100px|left]]
 
==Edited Volumes==
 
[http://www.amazon.com/Experimental-Philosophy-Joshua-Knobe/dp/0195323262 Experimental Philosophy]. (Oxford University Press, 2008).
 
===Reviews===
 
:*[http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=4409 Neil Levy, (2008), Review of 'Experimental Philosophy'. ''Metapsychology Reviews Online'' 12 (33).]
 
<blockquote>This anthology mixes together previously published and new work in experimental philosophy, by many of its leading figures (among whom the editors feature prominently). Experimental philosophy is a burgeoning movement that urges philosophers to leave their armchairs and test their philosophical claims empirically. It builds upon but goes further than the movement that Jesse Prinz, in his contribution, calls empirical philosophy; philosophy that turns to existing scientific literature to find evidence for philosophical claim. Experimental philosophy involves philosophers actually getting their... </blockquote>
 
 
:*[http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=14828 Review in ''Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews'' by Frank Jackson, December 6, 2008]
 
 
:*[http://www.joshdmay.com/wp-content/media/xphi-review.pdf Joshua May (forthcoming). Review of Experimental Philosopy Ed. By Knobe and Nichols. Philosophical Psychology.]
 
<blockquote>Experimental philosophy is a new and somewhat controversial method of philosophical inquiry in which philosophers conduct experiments in order to shed light on issues of philosophical interest. This typically involves surveying ordinary people to find out their “intuitions” (roughly, pre-theoretical judgments) about hypothetical cases important to philosophical theorizing. The controversy surrounding this methodology (I prefer this to “movement”) arises largely because it departs from more traditional ways of doing philosophy. Moreover, some of its practitioners have used it to argue that... </blockquote>
 
 
==Books Related to X-Phi==
 
[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674026098/experimentalp-20 Kwame Anthony Appiah: Experiments in Ethics (Mary Flexner Lecture Series of Bryn Mawr College)]
 
<blockquote>Appiah explores how the new empirical moral psychology relates to philosophical ethics. He elaborates a vision of naturalism that resists both temptations and traces an intellectual genealogy of the burgeoning discipline of 'experimental philosophy'.</blockquote>
 
 
[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262693542/experimentalp-20 Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness (Bradford Books)]
 
 
[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262693577/experimentalp-20 Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity (Bradford Books)]
 
 
[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262693550/experimentalp-20 Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books)]
 
 
=Press Coverage=
 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/09wwln-idealab-t.html The New New Philosophy]
 
:Kwame Anthony Appiah, ''New York Times''
 
[http://www.slate.com/id/2137223/ The X-Philes ''Philosophy meets the real world'']
 
:Jon Lackman, ''Slate''
 
[http://chronicle.com/free/v55/i06/06b00901.htm Against Intuition]
 
:Christopher Shea, ''Chronicle of Higher Education''
 
[http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17815241 Next Big Thing]
 
:Anthony Appiah, ''Talk of the Nation'' on National Public Radio
 
 
=Useful Links=
 
 
==Websites==
 
[http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/ '''Joshua Knobe's Page''']
 
 
[http://xphisurveys.wordpress.com/ '''X Phi Surveys''']
 
 
[http://www.facebook.com/home.php#/group.php?gid=3040510972 '''The X-Phi Facebook Group''']
 
 
[http://www.myspace.com/experimentalphilosophy '''The X-Phi MySpace Page''']
 
 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_philosophy '''Wikipedia: Experimental Philosophy''']
 
 
[http://www.bris.ac.uk/philosophy/projects/exp_phil '''Bristol Experimental Philosophy Page''']
 
 
==X-phi on Twitter==
 
Follow [http://twitter.com/xphilosopher '''xphilosopher''']
 
 
==X-Phi Blogs==
 
[http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/ '''Experimental Philosophy Page''']
 
:<rss>http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/atom.xml|short|max=3</rss>
 
 
[http://blogs.psychologytoday.com/blog/experiments-in-philosophy '''Psychology Today's ''Experiments in Philosophy'' ''']
 
:<rss>http://blogs.psychologytoday.com/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/feed|short|max=3</rss>
 
 
==YouTube==
 
[http://www.youtube.com/user/xphilosophy '''Xphilosophy YouTube Channel''']
 
 
::<youtube width="250" height="200">0dTQh__09ro</youtube>
 
::::[http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dTQh__09ro Experimental Philosophy on Freedom]
 
 
::<youtube width="250" height="200">tt5Kxv8eCTA&feature=channel_page</youtube>
 
::::[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt5Kxv8eCTA&feature=channel_page The Experimental Philosophy Anthem by Alina Simone]
 
 
::<youtube width="250" height="200">CS4DdLikfPk&feature=channel</youtube>
 
::::[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS4DdLikfPk&feature=channel Jesse Prinz on Experimental Philosophy]
 
 
::<youtube width="250" height="200">sHoyMfHudaE&feature=channel</youtube>
 
::::[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHoyMfHudaE&feature=channel Experimental Philosophy and Intentional Action w/ Eugene Mirman]
 
 
::<youtube width="250" height="200">rrtMAwGmNOo&feature=channel</youtube>
 
::::[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrtMAwGmNOo&feature=channel Experimental Philosophy and Free Will]
 
 
==X-Phi Related Blogs==
 
[http://fragments.consc.net/ '''Fragments of Consciousness''']
 
:''David Chalmers''
 
::<rss>http://fragments.consc.net/djc/atom.xml|short|max=3</rss>
 
[http://mymindismadeup.net/ '''My Mind is Made Up!''']
 
:''Justin Sytsma''
 
::<rss>http://mymindismadeup.net/feed/index.php|short|max=3</rss>
 
[http://naturalrationality.blogspot.com/ '''Natural Rationality''']
 
:''Benoit Hardy-Vallée''
 
::<rss>http://naturalrationality.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default|short|max=3</rss>
 
[http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/ '''The Splintered Mind''']
 
:''Eric Schwitzgebel''
 
::<rss>http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/atom.xml|short|max=3</rss>
 
[http://claytonlittlejohn.blogspot.com/ '''Think Tonk''']
 
:''Clayton Littlejohn''
 
::<rss>http://claytonlittlejohn.blogspot.com/atom.xml|short|max=3</rss>
 
 
==Journals==
 
[[Image:Cognition Cover.gif|thumb]]
 
[http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0003-2638 Analysis]
 
* Published five articles on intentional action, then went on to reject all the later experimental philosophy papers that were submitted.
 
 
[http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00100277 Cognition]
 
* Published a series of articles on moral cognition and on the relation between moral cognition and causal judgment.
 
 
[http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03640213 Cognitive Science]
 
* No experimental philosophy articles yet but it seems like a good bet.
 
 
[http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13646613 Trends in Cognitive Sciences]
 
* Publishes reviews of existing literature, including one on moral grammar and on the Knobe Effect.
 
 
==Societies==
 
 
[http://x-phi.org/ XPS (Experimental Philosophy Society)]
 
 
[http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/ Cognitive Science Society]
 
 
[http://philsci.org/news/PSA06 Philosophy of Science Association]
 
 
[http://www.socphilpsych.org/ Society for Philosophy and Psychology]
 
 
[http://www.niu.edu/sspp/ The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology]
 
 
==X-Phi Secrets==
 
[http://www.cafepress.com/xphi Experimental Philosophy T-Shirts]
 
 
[http://www.mixtapecollective.org/mixtape/?mix=2740 The Official Experimental Philosophy Mixed Tape]
 
 
=References=
 
<references/>
 

Latest revision as of 13:14, 1 September 2009

Good News! The Experimental Philosophy Page has moved to: www.experimentalphilosophy.org/wiki