Ontario Electricity Policy

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Ontario electricity policy refers to plans, legislation, incentives, guidelines, and policy processes put in place by the Government of the Province of Ontario, Canada, to address issues of electricity production, distribution, and consumption.

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Early history
In 1925, Ontario Hydro (WIKI) (Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario) constructed the largest hydroelectric plant, Queenston-Chippawa (now Beck 1). From this early beginning until 1950, Ontario Hydro was able to meet the growing demand increase of approximately 7% per year, except during the great depression (1930). Planning for Ontario's electricity demand was relatively simple for two reasons: (1) electricity was coming almost entirely from hydroelectric power; and (2) the electricity system was made of several smaller systems, making for easy management.

The first two planning problems arose in 1950s: the waterpower sites became exhausted and the distribution system across Ontario was limited in capacity. To address these problems, Ontario Hydro began constructing new coal-fired electricity generation plants and set out plans to build nuclear power plants across the province of Ontario to ensure that future base load demands would be met. By the early 1970s, Pickering A was on stream and Bruce A was under construction.

Electricity demand planning 1970s-1990s
Following the choice for nuclear powered electrical generation coupled with inflation and a recession in 1970, the Porter Commission (1975-1979) performed a detail review of the problem of electricity supply. The Porter Commission's conclusions were simple: demand management, not supply planning, must be the focus of Ontario electricity planning. [citation needed]

It was not until 1989, however, that Ontario Hydro published their first Supply/Demand Plan Report, "Providing the Balance of Power". The estimated an annual demand increase of 2.2% over 25 years, until 2014. This translated to a generation capacity increase from 23,200 MW to 39,800 MW. [citation needed] {WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT? I think it would be more relevant if you are comparing the 39,800 figure to what it would be needed with a larger demand forecast}

In the 1990's, the enormous debt resulting from the Darlington nuclear station (WIKI? ) became a major political issue. This debt forced Ontario Hydro to reduce staff numbers and transmission investments. As a result of these dilemmas, Ontario Hydro also published a document called Hydro 21. This report suggested that electricity in Ontario should be restructured. [citation needed]

In 1992, Ontario Hydro issued a revised Supply/Demand Plan Report. The recession in the industrial sector and the growing flexibility to use alternate high efficiency gas-fired powered generation, however, delayed further planning of new generation capacity. Ontario Hydro's attention diverted to restructuring the electricity industry. [citation needed]

In 1995, the Mike Harris government commissioned the Macdonald Committee. The committee recommended the elimination of Ontario Hydro's monopoly for managing generation capacity and that the electricity market be opened up to competition. In response to the Macdonald Committee's recommendations, the Ontario government drafted the 1997 white paper "Direction for Change: Charting a Course for Competitive Electricity and Jobs in Ontario" which detailed the government's intention to open the market for electricity supply.

The competitive market did not open until May 2002. Electricity prices rose significantly after this, due to a combination of an extreme summer temperatures, associated demand increases, and the temporary unavailability of Ontario generating units. [citation needed] Under pressure from consumers, the government introduced the Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply (EPCS) Act in December 2002. [Change this citation to the actual act, not a secondary source] This regulation capped the price of electricity. All transmissions and distribution rates were also frozen at their existing levels and would remain unchanged until May 1, 2006. The net result was a complete cessation of new investment in generation capacity and a significant cutback in new investment in transmission and distribution.

Needs for Reinvestment
It was not until 2003 that the government realized that Ontario might face a supply shortage if no action was taken. The Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force (ECSTF) submitted their recommendation in January 2004. The task force concluded that the market approach adopted in the late 1990s needs substantial enhancement if it is to deliver the new generation and conservation Ontario needs, within the timeframes we need them. [citation needed] The task force also suggested that a long-term plan for generation and conservation was needed and following the recommendations of the ECSTF, the government created the Ontario Electricity Restructuring Act in 2004. This in turn led to the creation of the Ontario Power Authority (OPA). One of the four mandates of the OPA was to address the power system planning issue.

The Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP)
Over the next 20 years, approximately 80% of the province of Ontario's existing electricity generation capacity will need to be replaced with alternative generation capacity that incorporates a combination of improved conservation and demand management. In light of this difficult task, in May 2005 the Minister of Energy, Dwight Duncan, asked the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to provide recommendations on what would be the appropriate mix of electricity supply sources to satisfy the expected demand in 2025, taking into account conservation targets and new sources of renewable energy.

Existing Installed Generation Sources (as of December 2006).

Source: Independent Electricity System Operator (Ontario).,

Ontario faces three major electricity challenges: (1) the phasing-out of coal as a generation capacity source by 2009; (2) the impending end-of-life shutdown nuclear generation capacity from 2009 to 2025; and (3) the steady increase of summer peak-demand in normal weather patterns.

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IPSP Evaluation and Development Process
In December 2005, the OPA issued the Supply Mix Advice Report in response to the Minister's request. It detailed the contribution of both existing and future potential sources of energy generation available to meet the electricity production requirements currently and going forward until 2025. This report suggests that given the projected increased demand for energy and the replacement of coal generation capacity, the amount of renewable energy generation and gas-fired generation must also be increased.

On June 13, 2006 Dwight Duncan, Ontario's Minister of Energy, issued directives for the preparation of the IPSP. Since that time, the OPA has published eight discussion papers, as well as a preliminary version of the IPSP. It is expected that the OPA will submit the IPSP to the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), who will review and then either accept or reject the plan. The OEB is a regulatory body whose mandate is to ensure that the IPSP complies with the Minister of Energy's directives as well as the IPSP directives and that the plan is prudent and cost effective.

If the OEB does not approve the IPSP based on the evaluation criteria set out by the Government of Ontario in the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004, then the IPSP is sent back to the OPA for revision. If the OEB approves the plan, then the OPA will then put the IPSP into effect.

Existing Environmental Policy Process
In an amendment to the Electricity Act, 1998, the OPA was instructed to "[e]nsure that safety, environmental protection and environmental sustainability are considered" in the development of the Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP). The OPA's approach to sustainability is outlined in IPSP Discussion Paper #6: Sustainability.

The OPA defines sustainable development according to the definition agreed upon by the World Commission on Environment and Development's 1983 report, Our Common Future (WIKI ): "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

The OPA has based their consideration of sustainability in the IPSP on Robert B. Gibson's Sustainability Assessment: Criteria and Processes. Six context-specific criteria were discussed: feasibility, reliability, cost, flexibility, environmental performance, and societal acceptance. .

One criticism of this approach is that the OPA's discussion paper on sustainability was published both after the supply mix advice was given to the Ontario Government and after the supply mix directives were given to the OPA by Ontario's Minister of Energy. undefined Also, several elements of Gibson's sustainability assessment framework were not implemented or discussed in Discussion Paper #6: Sustainability. .

The IPSP regulation mandates that the OPA consider environmental sustainability in the IPSP. The OEB, the body responsible for evaluating the IPSP, defines "consider" as meaning "weighed and evaluated". Thus, the OPA is only liable for evaluating the sustainability of the IPSP rather than for the incorporation of sustainability into the IPSP.

Central planning & traditional regulation versus competitive markets
With no formal document or white paper from the government of Ontario actually explaining how the current system is supposed to work, debates on the merits of a centrally planned system versus a competitive market approach persist, despite the fact that the deregulation experiment failed in the province.

Central planning & traditional regulation
Central or traditional electricity planning is designed to expand supply resources to meet demand growth and to minimize the economic costs of this expansion by improving  economies of scale in electricity generation. Economies-of-scale exist for a vertically integrated electric utility because a larger generating system can provide power to many users, and additional users can be accommodated with small increases in power costs.

Almost invariably, traditional regulation accompanies a centrally planned system. Traditional regulation is intended to restrict or replace competition with administrative restraints on profits. In Ontario, electricity rates were typically set by Ontario Hydro as an approximation to its long-run average cost of service, plus a mark up to recover capital investment costs.

Howard Hampton, leader of the Ontario New Democratic Party (WIKI), argues that this averaging out of the cost of power ensures supply meets demand in a cost-effective manner. For example, to ensure overall system reliability, a considerable portion of generation capacity from peaking plants must remain idle most of the time. Operating costs for peaking plants, however, are usually expensive because they inefficiently convert costly fossil fuels to electricity.

In Ontario's regulated system, costs were averaged out between base load and peaking stations. In other words, the insurance cost of reliability is spread out and shared equitably by all customers. Under a deregulated system, in which each generating station "must stand on its own two financial feet", the cost of ensuring such reliability would be considerably higher, as peaking plants would charge as much as the market will bear, as they are rationally expected to do.

Those who defend the combination of tradition regulation and central planning for the electricity sector, like  Hampton, often base their arguments on the basic premise that electricity is an essential good required for consumer well-being. According to Hampton, central planning and regulation are required to ensure reliability in both the supply and delivery and the generation and infrastructure aspects. Whereas planning under a market regime is profit-driven, central planning can ensure that Ontario's best interests are being attended to and not just the interests of private investors. Stephan Schott, for example, has stated that, at least theoretically, state ownership of the electricity sector could satisfy all of the criteria for socially efficient and environmentally sustainable electricity production. This includes fully internalizing external social costs of electricity production and pricing electricity according to demand fluctuations, even while maintaining stable supply.

Deregulation & competitive markets
Central planning, however, is not without limitations. Central planning has the disadvantage of following political objectives too closely. The tendency for government has been to avoid creating policies that could make electricity consumption more expensive or that would require citizen to adjust their consumption habits.

Furthermore, central planning, which seeks to improve economies of scale, has historically "led to a nearly universal strategy of rapid capacity expansion and promotion of demand growth, with little consideration of the necessity or efficiency of energy use". This is true of Ontario Hydro, which, faced with the threat of cheap natural gas in the late 1950s, made the ill-fated decision to protect its market share by encouraging consumers to use more electricity. Ontario Hydro was forced to build new, more expensive generating plants and transmission and distribution infrastructure to keep up with demand.

Although signs were present by the early 1970s indicating that consumer demand growth was falling, Wayne Skene argues that "Ontario Hydro's board and management had remained locked in megaproject mode, persisting in the belief that demand would continue to double every decade". Therefore, simply in terms of scale of operations, it can be argued that central planning in Ontario, by overestimating future demand and building unnecessary capacity, has been economically inefficient and has imposed unwarranted costs upon the environment.

Proponents of deregulation and restructuring of the electricity sector used these limitations to strengthen their case, arguing that such flaws are typical of regulated/centrally planned systems. Ronald Daniels and Michael Trebilcock, for example, argue that a premium should be placed on incrementalism and decentralization in terms of decision-making, rather than planning for "some once-and-for-all, system-wide set of collective decisions as to the future of the [electricity] industry". Moreover, they argue that competitive markets have the added advantage of being able to rely on the knowledge and expertise possessed by investors to generate a more rational assessment of the alleged merits of a given project.

Deregulation would ensure that rates would no longer be based on long-term average costs, as determined by a central regulating entity, to pricing based on short-term  marginal costs. A plant's marginal cost varies considerably based on age, technology, fuel conversion efficiency, and so on. Both regulated and deregulated systems operate to minimize the avoidable costs of meeting instantaneous demand.

As demand is communicated to a power system dispatcher, this least-cost operating principle requires the dispatcher to first fire up plants with the lowest marginal costs. In other words, rates in a deregulated system are "determined by hungry competitors contending for the last megawatt of demand in a market that clears every five minutes".

Eliminating average cost of service rates creates the need for a market to determine electricity rates.

The term restructuring generally refers to the creation of these markets and the disintegration of vertically integrated utilities. The theoretical gains from restructuring are numerous. Competition, coupled with freeing electricity generators from cost of service rates, ought to give generators powerful incentives to cut costs, which will lower consumer prices in the long-term. In other words, deregulation is said to subject the electricity sector to the "innovative and productive forces of competition".

Competition would require generating facilities to assume a much tougher stance in negotiating contracts for fuel sources, labour, and maintenance. It would also require utilities to focus on innovation to increase technological efficiency in order to remain competitive. In addition, Timothy Considine and Andrew Kleit argue that competition would improve the efficiency of allocating electricity.

As Don Dewees explains, investors in a competitive market will build new capacity when they expect to recover "all capital and operating costs from the expected markets price. If market prices will not cover the cost of the investment, that investment is socially excessive". In theory, this particular aspect of deregulation should correct the systemic over-expansionary tendencies of centrally planned regimes.

However, competitive markets are not without limitations either. Basic economic theory dictates that for competition to exist, a large number of market participants are required. Experience with deregulation in the United States and the United Kingdom, however, has shown that competitive markets can lead to market power concentration and market manipulation. In these jurisdictions, the market has been threatened by the strategic behaviour of incumbents and new entrants that have too large a market share.

The case of Enron in California is a prime example. For a competitive market to function, firms cannot significantly influence prices by adjusting or shutting down supply individually. Furthermore, the promise of competitive markets to lower consumer prices, for the most part, has yet to materialize.

Data from the United States, for example, indicates that while Pennsylvania and Connecticut have fairly stable residential prices since restructuring, most other states have witnessed price increases after the year 2000. While this may be good news in terms of conservation and demand-side management (C&DM) objectives, it has made competitive markets unpopular among consumers and politically troublesome. For example, as consumer prices rose during Ontario's experiment with deregulation, Premier Ernie Eves, under surmounting political pressure, intervened into the market by freezing retail prices in November 2002.

Government intervention into the marketplace, although certainly supported by electricity consumers, creates doubt in the minds of potential investors, who then begin to question the government's commitment to restructuring. An unattractive environment for private investors, in turn, threatens overall supply in a competitive market regime, as planning for and building new generating capacity becomes an increasing risk. This is why to some supporters of restructuring, like Dewees, "[t]he greatest risk to competitive markets may not be power shortages or heat waves but government intervention…"

Electricity demand explained
Electricity use can be classified in various ways, whether by sector, base load versus peak demand, or seasonal/daily peak demand.

Demand by sector
Electricity use can be divided into three main sectors (FIGURES NEED SOURCE) :


 * Residential sector: this includes residential space and water heating and cooling, lighting, household appliances, etc. Electricity use in this sector accounts for about one third of total consumption. Residential demand is projected to decline slightly.
 * Commercial sector: this includes mainly space heating, and cooling, as well as commercial and office lighting. This sector accounts for about 39% of total electricity consumption today and is projected to grow the most.
 * Industrial sector: this includes manufacturing activities, mining activities, forestry and construction. Industrial consumers account for approximately 28% of electricity consumed. This consumption is projected to remain stable.

Base load and peak demand
Electricity demand can also be separated as base load and peak demand. Base load refers to constant, or unvarying, demand for electricity. In Ontario, base load amounts to approximately 13,000 MW and is met by nuclear and hydroelectric power. These supply options generally have low operating costs and are unable to rapidly change their output.

Peak demand refers to fluctuating, or varying, needs for electricity above and beyond base load levels. Added to this base load, the peak load raises Ontario's maximum electricity demand to 27,000 MW. This peak is typically met by oil/natural gas-fired, coal and select hydro-electric power plants. These plants can respond to changes in demand rapidly, but have higher operating costs, as noted above. Average demand in Ontario is currently 17,500 MW (SOURCE NEEDED).

Seasonal/daily peak demand
Electricity demand is greatly affected by seasonal variations. A recent trend has developed whereby summer peak demand has grown to outpace winter peak loads <font color="#339966">(SOURCE NEEDED). This is primarily the result of increasingly warm summer conditions. The highest load recorded in Ontario occurred on August 1, 2006, when peak demand for electricity reached 27,005 MW. The highest winter peak demand occurred February 13, 2007, when peak demand was 25,868 MW.

Peak demand also varies by the time of day. The daily peak period refers to the time of the day when demand is at its high. In winter, there are generally two peaking periods: around 10:30 a.m. in the morning and around 6 p.m. in the evening. In summer months, demand peaks in the late afternoon, when temperatures are at their hottest.

Current and expected future electricity demand
Current annual electricity demand in Ontario is 151 TWh <font color="#339966">(SOURCE NEEDED). In other words, on average, Ontarians consume 12,750 kWh per person per year. Based on 2003 information, this figure is approximately 25% lower than the Canadian average, roughly equal to U.S. rates, and about twice as high as European consumption levels (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI LINK "electricity consumption by country"). In order to supply such demand, Ontario counts on 31,000 MW of installed power capacity, broken down as follows: 37% nuclear, 26% renewable (including hydro-electric power), 16% natural gas and 21% coal.

<font color="#FF0000">IMAGE 4.1

Variables affecting Ontario electricity demand
Total electricity demand has been increasing in Ontario over the last decades, at a rate of approximately 0.5% <font color="#339966">(SOURCE NEEDED). Several factors affect how much energy is consumed by Ontarians. These include:


 * Population growth: According to 2006 census data, Ontario's population has increased roughly at a rate of 1.20% per year during the past 5 years <font color="#339966">(SOURCE NEEDED) . This has resulted in associated increases in electricity consumption.
 * Economic growth: Ontario's GDP growth has varied between 2% and 3% in recent years, and is expected to average 2.9% over the next five years. This has also driven demand for electricity supplies.
 * Climate variability: Given that a great part of electricity consumption is related to space and water heating and cooling, warming temperatures in Ontario have resulted in higher electricity consumption rates, particularly in the residential and commercial sectors.
 * Industrial activity: Heavy industry (mining, pulp and paper, auto manufacturing, etc.) consumes more energy than service- and knowledge-related economic sectors. Ontario has a large proportion of heavy industries relative to other provinces in Canada, and as a result, higher industrial energy use levels.
 * Electricity prices: Although similar to other provinces in Canada, the price of electricity in Ontario is generally cheaper than in other North American jurisdictions. Financial incentives to consume less electricity are therefore lacking.
 * Conservation and Demand Management (C&DM) practices: C&DM initiatives can significantly reduce electricity demand. Conservation can result in improved productivity, lower energy bills and price fluctuations, as well reduced environmental impacts.

Demand projections
All of the above variables affect the forecasting of future electricity demand. The uncertainty embedded in these factors accumulates and makes it difficult to determine how much electricity will be consumed in the future.

In its 2005 Supply Mix Advice Report ,the Ontario Power Authority estimated that electricity demand will grow at a rate of 0.9% annually between 2006 and 2025, rising to approximately 170 TWh per year by 2025. This OPA estimate is nearly double the actual rate of electricity demand growth between 1990 and 2003 of 0.5% per year. In fact, the rate of growth in electricity demand in Ontario has been in decline since 1950. This was a result of the structural changes in the Ontario economy over this period, particularly the decline of heavy manufacturing and increased growth in the service and knowledge sectors.

The OPA projections are controversial. Organizations like Pollution Probe, the Pembina Institute, and the <font color="#0000FF"> Ontario Clean Air Alliance claim that the OPA Supply Mix is fundamentally supply oriented and overestimates future electricity demand. They base their claims on several reports that estimate lower demand projections.

C&DM initiatives in Ontario
Demand-Side Management (DSM) consists of the implementation of different policies and measures that serve to influence the demand for a product. When talking about electricity, it is often referred to as Conservation and Demand Management (C&DM), as it aims to reduce electricity demand, either by using more efficient technologies or by changing wasteful habits. C&DM also addresses reductions in peak demand via Demand Response (DR) programs. Demand Response does not lower total electricity demand; rather, it shifts demand out of the peak times.

Benefits of C&DM for Ontario
Economically rational and technically feasible conservation is considered by some to be the cheapest, cleanest way to bridge the gap between supply and demand. For example, load reductions are vital in achieving the goal of shutting down Ontario's coal plants and in avoiding imports of US coal-fired power, which entails important health and environmental benefits. Moreover, the implementation of aggressive C&DM mechanisms would lower consumers' bills while increasing the province's energy productivity.

Ontario's economy currently reflects relatively low electricity productivity levels, measured as GDP per electricity use. The state of New York has an electricity productivity rate that is 2.3 times higher than that of Ontario. Furthermore, it would reduce or eliminate exposure to price volatility in gas, oil, and uranium supplies. C&DM programs are also advantageous in that they can be implemented within limited time horizons and budgets relative to the huge lead times and financial risks involved in the installation of new generation plants.

Potential for conservation and energy efficiency in Ontario
Based on their estimates of future demand, the OPA has recommended 1,820 MW as a target for peak demand reduction to be achieved by 2025. After consultation with stakeholder groups who deemed this target too low, Ontario's C&DM goals were eventually adjusted to reflect a new target of 6,300 MW of conservation by 2025 (1,350 MW by 2007, an extra 1,350 MW by 2010, and an additional 3,600 MW by 2025).

The largest potential for energy savings in Ontario has been identified in lighting, space heating, air conditioning, manufacturing machinery, and commercial equipment. According to an CFI Consulting Co. assessment commissioned by the OPA, this potential applies to all three electricity sectors:


 * The residential sector accounted for one third of energy use in Ontario. CFI Consulting suggests that there is a potential electricity savings of 31% in Ontario's residential sector by 2015 via lighting and space heating upgrades.
 * The commercial sector accounts for 39% of Ontario's total electricity consumption. The CFI reports a potential savings of 33% in this sector mainly in interior lighting and cooling retrofits.
 * The industrial sector, which includes all manufacturing activities, mining, forestry and construction, accounts for approximately 28% of electricity use in Ontario. Based on the CFI report, a 36% energy savings is possible in this sector based on investments in new heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment.

Government units involved in C&DM
Some key governmental units involved in generating a 'culture of conservation' include:

Ontario Conservation Bureau

The Conservation Bureau is a governmental organization established by the Ontario government as a division of Ontario Power Authority in 2005. Its mandate is to promote C&DM programs that defer the need to invest in new generation and transmission infrastructure. Programs managed by the Conservation Bureau include:


 * Low income and social housing initiatives designed to reduce electricity consumption by a total of 100 MW in 33,000 homes.
 * Savings rebates which encourage Ontario residents to reduce their electricity use by installing energy efficient cooling and heating equipment.
 * Demand response programs that offer consumers compensation for curtailing their electricity demand during specific times of day.

Ontario Ministry of Energy (MOE)

The Ontario Ministry of Energy is responsible for ensuring that Ontario's electricity system functions at the highest level of reliability and productivity. This includes establishing energy efficiency standards, including Energy Star (WIKI) standards for appliances and windows. The Ministry has recently begun a program to remove T12 (tubular 1.5 inch fluorescent) commercial lamps by 2011.

Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing

The Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing has begun encouraging private sector housing developers to increase the energy efficiency standards of new homes. Other programs include:


 * A three-year review of Ontario's building code to upgrade the energy efficiency performance of Ontario buildings.
 * Financial incentives (in the form of rebates) for energy efficiency in affordable housing units.
 * Implementation of [file://oee.nrcan.gc.ca\residential\energuide-for-houses.cfm ecoENERGY] building standards beginning in 2007 (the official government of Canada mark associated with the labelling and rating of the energy consumption or energy efficiency of specific products)

Office of Energy Efficiency

The Office of Energy Efficiency (OEE) was established in April 1998 as part of Natural Resources Canada and is the primary federal office for energy efficiency. OEE responsibilities include: the promotion energy efficiency in major energy sectors (industrial, residential, commercial, and building); the provision of energy efficiency information to the public; the collection of data and publication of energy efficiency trends (LINK TO http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/neud/dpa/data_e/Trends04/Trends2004.pdf)

Ontario Energy Board

Since 2005, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) put into place two mechanisms to create incentives for local distribution companies (LDCs) to promote C&DM programmes: a Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM), by which utilities recover all of the revenues that they would have collected had they not promoted sales reductions through conservation and energy efficiency; and a Shared Savings Mechanism (SSM), by which consumers and utilities share the benefits associated with the implementation of C&DM programmes.

Supply Options
Electricity supplies can be classified as either distributed or centralized in nature. Whereas conventional, centralized generation involves few generation facilities connected via high-voltage transmission lines spanning long distances, distributed generation facilities are located close to the load—or in technical speak, on the customer side of the meter—although not necessarily restricted to local uses. In this scheme, distributed energy sources are more numerous and sufficiently smaller than central generating plants so as to allow interconnection at nearly any point in the electricity system.

IMAGE CENTRALIZED VS DECENTRALIZED

Distributed generation (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI )—sometimes known as 'dispersed' or 'embedded' generation when referring to small-scale wind generation—generally describes only renewable electricity sources with capacities less than 10 MW. Technologies often associated with distributed generation include co-generation—also known as combined heat and power (CHP) generation—as well as small (and micro) turbines, fuel cells, and gas generators used for on-site or emergency backup power. (<font color="#0000FF">THESE CAN ALL HAVE WIKI LINKS )

Renewables can also be considered distributed technologies, depending on their application. Typically, community wind farms, solar photovoltaic arrays, geothermal installations, and biomass-fuelled power facilities are typically sufficiently limited in their generation capacity that they qualify as distributed energy sources. Conversely, large hydropower plants and offshore wind parks, with substantial production capacities of 50-100 MW or more which feed into high-voltage transmission grids, cannot be considered distributed generation.

Coal
Coal-fired power plants (<font color="#0000FF">Link to Wiki:Fossil Fuel Generation Plant ) make up about 21% of Ontario's existing energy supply (6,434 MW) and 19% of total Ontario electricity production (30.9 TWh).

Existing coal generation in Ontario
Ontario currently has four coal-fired power plants in operation:

In April 2005, the government of Ontario closed the Lakeview Generating Station in Mississauga, Ontario (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ), representing 1,140 MW of generating capacity.
 * Thunder Bay Generating Station (LINK TO WIKI)
 * Location: Thunder Bay, Ontario (WIKI)
 * Total Capacity: 2 units, 310 MW
 * Atikokan Generating Station
 * Location: Town of Atikokan, Ontario, between Thunder Bay and Kenora (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI )
 * Total Capacity: 1 unit, 215 MW
 * Lambton Generating Station
 * Location: Corunna, Ontario (south of Sarnia) (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI )
 * Total Capacity: 4 units, 1,975 MW
 * Nanticoke Generating Station (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI )
 * Location: Haldmiand County, Ontario (near Port Dover) (WIKI)
 * Total Capacity: 8 units, 3,938 MW

Financial, environmental, and health considerations
Coal-fired electricity generation is currently inexpensive relative to other energy sources. In 2005, the average price of coal power in Ontario was C$46/MWh, compared to $89/MWh and $107/MWh for oil/natural gas generation and hydropower, respectively.

Despite cost advantages, Ontario's coal plants emit large quantities of greenhouse gases and smog-causing pollutants each year. The Ontario Clean Air Alliance [<font color="#0000FF">LINK ] is perhaps the loudest critic of coal-fired generation in this regard. The latest figures, from 2005, reported in the Canadian Government's National Pollutant Release Inventory and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program, show that the Nanticoke Generating Station is the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases (CO2) (17,629,437 tonnes) and fifth largest emitter of air pollutants (107,689,470 kg) in Canada. Nevertheless, thanks in part to acid rain controls implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, coal emissions have been dropping. In total, Ontario's coal plants emitted 14% (37,000 tonnes) of all NOx, 28% (154,000 tonnes) of all SO2, and 20% (495kg) of all Hg (mercury) emissions in 2003, respectively.

IMAGE CO2 EMISSIONS

A cost-benefit analysis released by the provincial government in April 2005, found that emissions from all Ontario coal-fired stations are responsible for up to 668 premature deaths, 928 hospital admissions, 1,100 emergency room visits, and 333,600 minor illness (headaches, coughing, respiratory symptoms) per year.

New 'clean coal' (WIKI) technologies—such as Flue Gas Desulphurization (FGD) "scrubbers" for SO2 removal and Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) (WIKI) for NOX—can be used to reduce toxic releases, but have no effect on carbon emissions and are expensive to install. Testifying before a legislative committee in February 2007 [link], Jim Hankinson, chief executive of Ontario Power Generation [link], estimated the cost of installing new scrubbers on Ontario's coal plants between C$500 million and C$1.5 billion.

As of 2007, two of the four smokestacks at Lambton and two of eight stacks at the Nanticoke station are currently equipped with scrubbers. The OPA is expected to recommend whether or not to install scrubbers at remaining coal facilities in Spring 2007.

Plans for coal in Ontario
The Ontario Liberals came to power in 2003 promising to phase-out and replace all of the province's coal stations by 2007. In 2005, the Government pushed back the target date to 2009, citing reliability concerns. It has since revised this plan once more, maintaining its political commitment, but refusing to set a specific deadline for a complete phase-out. Instead, it instructed the OPA to: "Plan for coal-fired generation in Ontario be replaced by cleaner sources in the earliest practical time frame that ensures adequate generating capacity and electric system reliability in Ontario." [Emphasis added]

The OPA has subsequently published preliminary plans for a complete coal phase-out by 2014, to begin in 2011. Coal generators are expected to be replaced by new renewable energy and natural gas generation facilities, as well as conservation measures. Detailed phase-out reports and implementation plans will be completed by 2010.

Natural gas
Natural gas (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ) accounts for 8% of Ontario's power generation capacity, with 102 natural gas generating stations in Ontario. In Ontario, natural gas is most commonly used for heating applications in homes and businesses but natural gas fired power generation is also a significant component of the power supply mix.

Financial, environmental, and health considerations
Natural gas is a fossil fuel (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ) composed mainly of methane (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ), which can be burned to release heat that is then used to produce electricity (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ).

Natural gas contains very little sulfur, no ash and almost no metals; therefore, unlike with coal, heavy metal and SOx (sulfur dioxide (WIKI) and sulfur trioxide (WIKI)) pollution is not a major concern. In the United States the average natural gas-fired plant emits 516 kg of carbon dioxide (WIKI), 0.05 kg of sulfur dioxide and 0.8 kg of nitrogen oxides (NOx (WIKI)) per megawatt-hour of energy generated. Compared with coal, natural gas generates about half as much carbon dioxide, one third of the nitrogen oxides, and one one-hundredth of the sulfur oxides.

Existing natural gas generation in Ontario
Ontario has limited natural gas reserves. Most of Ontario's natural gas comes from British Columbia (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ), Saskatchewan (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ) and Alberta (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ).

Oil and gas generation accounts for 5,103 MW of installed capacity in Ontario, set to increase to increase to 9,300 MW by 2010. 1,722 MW of this capacity is from the 29 non-utility generators in Ontario.

Plans for natural gas in Ontario
In 2006 the Ontario government directed the OPA to use natural gas to meet peak time energy demand. The OPA was also instructed to develop high efficiency and value use options for natural gas. The OPA has therefore decided to use natural gas for two applications: (1) local area reliability and (2) system capacity.

Natural gas intended to meet Ontario's intermediate and peak generation needs, replacing the role of coal generation as it is phased out. By 2025, installed natural gas and cogeneration capacity is targeted to increase from the current 4,976 MW to 11,000 MW--roughly 27% of system generation capacity. That said, due to its predominant use only in high-value energy applications, natural gas is only expected to account for 6% of Ontario's overall electricity production.

Cogeneration
Cogeneration (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ), or combined heat and power (CHP), refers to the concurrent generation of power and heat from the same energy source. The heat is then used in local applications such as heating homes. Cogeneration can more than triple the efficiency of fuel usage (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ) by employing the waste heat from the power generation process.

Financial, environmental, and health considerations
Cogeneration can be applied to any fuel which is combusted for energy. Fossil fuels, biomass and biogas can all be used in CHP plants. Transporting heat over long distances is impractical, however, so cogeneration plants are usually small and located close to the energy load. Hence, cogeneration is inherently linked to distributed generation (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI distributed generation ). The urban location of CHP plants makes them very compatible with clean-burning fuels such as natural gas. The health concerns associated with other fossil fuels (see coal above) make them less suitable for areas with high population densities.

Cogeneration can dramatically increase the efficiency of fuel use. 48-64% of the energy from combustion can be recovered as heat, while only 25-37% is converted into power. The combined efficiency of heat and power use can be up to 91%. High efficiencies translate into much lower fuel costs as well as much lower greenhouse gas (WIKI) and other emissions.

Existing combined heat and power generation in Ontario
110 CHP generating plants are currently in operation in Ontario, with a total capacity of approximately 2,300 MW. Of these, 82 burn natural gas and the rest use biomass. Only 50 of these facilities are connected to the grid. (See: Simon Fraser's Cogeneration Database).

Plans for cogeneration in Ontario
The Ontario Power Authority anticipates that the contribution of cogeneration to conservation will be between 47 and 265 MW depending upon how aggressively it is pursued in Ontario. A request for proposals was sent out by the OPA in 2005 for up to 1,000 MW of new cogeneration. As a result, seven new CHP generating stations are currently being developed in Ontario under contracts executed in 2006 with a combined total capacity of 414 MW [<font color="#0000FF">Link ].

Nuclear
Nuclear power (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ) accounts for almost half of Ontario's power generation. The government plans to maintain nuclear power's role in energy generation through to 2025.

Financial, environmental, and health considerations
The Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) prepared a report for the Canadian Nuclear Association in 2004 [LINK] comparing environmental impacts of nuclear generation to other base load generation technologies in Ontario. They found nuclear power to be almost cost-comparable with coal generation. However, groups such as the Pembina Institute and the Ontario Clean Air Alliance criticize nuclear power because of the impact of uranium mining operations (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI: Uranium mining ), the long-term effects of radioactive waste (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI: radioactive waste ) and the potential terrorism and disaster risks of nuclear energy.

As of December, 2004 there were more than 1,700,000 used fuel bundles stored on-site at both operational and decommissioned nuclear generating stations around Ontario.

Nuclear facilities have long lead times for both environmental and other approvals, as well as actual construction. Ontario's nuclear history is also checkered with budget overruns and delays in new build and refurbished plants. Nuclear has high capital costs and lead times, but low operational costs, making it suitable only for base load applications. In comparison, natural gas plants have short lead times but high operational and fuel costs.

Existing nuclear generation in Ontario
Ontario currently has 16 nuclear units in operation. These reactors amount to 11,400 MW of generation capacity and are located at three sites: Pickering, Bruce and Darlington. Approximately one half of Ontario's power was generated from nuclear energy sources in 2005.

Plans for nuclear generation in Ontario
The OPA has been directed by the government to use nuclear energy to meet the base load of energy demand in Ontario, but that nuclear generation capacity should not exceed 14,000 MW. The result is that nuclear is projected to make up approximately 37% of generation capacity in Ontario and produce 50% of the power in 2025, similar to its role in the current supply mix.

To achieve this mix, more nuclear units will need to either be built or refurbished, as most of the reactors currently in service will exceed their useful lifetime before 2020. In response, the OPA has entered into an agreement with Bruce Power to refurbish two units at Bruce, which are anticipated to add 1,540 MW of generating capacity by 2009. Bruce Power also plans to refurbish a third unit in future. Ontario Power Generation (OPG) is currently conducting an environmental assessment for refurbishment of four operational units at Pickering B.

Renewables
Anthony

Imports
Ontario has an interconnection capacity totalling 4,000 MW. Connecting jurisdictions include: New York, Michigan, Quebec, Manitoba and Minnesota. The provincial grid is connected to the Eastern Interconnection (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ), managed by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (<font color="#0000FF">WIKI ).

Potential Canadian interconnections
The OPA Supply Mix Advice Report recommends 1,250 MW of imports for Ontario. This figure is derived mainly from short-term hydropower projects planned in Quebec. Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie [link] and Ontario's Hydro One [link], each province's electricity delivery company, signed an C$800 million agreement in November 2006 to construct a new 1,250 MW Quebec-Ontario interconnection by 2010.

There is also potential for new interconnections to Manitoba and/or Labrador. But due to cost and siting challenges, these plans remain tentative and are considered long-term possibilities (2015-2025).

Manitoba is planning two new hydropower projects, known as Conawapa Generating Station and Gull Island Generating Station, in northern Manitoba. Conawapa, located on the Lower Nelson River, is planned to have a projected capacity of 1,380 MW when it comes online in 2017. Gull Island, projected to be in service in 2011/2012, is expected to generate 600 MW. New long-distance high-voltage transmission lines will have to be built to the support the projects, as the existing interconnection line between Manitoba and Ontario is too small to allow for adequate upgrades.

Newfoundland and Labrador is planning to build two major generating stations, capable of generating roughly 2,800 MW on the Lower Churchill River in Labrador. The Muskrat Falls facility is to have a planned capacity of 824 MW, while the Gull Island project (unrelated to the Manitoba facility) is expected to generate 2,000 MW. Any interconnection to Ontario, however, would need the support of both the Quebec Government and the federal government, as the transmission of electricity generated in Labrador must run through Quebec.

Potential U.S. interconnections
Most imports from the United States are based on nuclear, natural gas, or coal-fired generation facilities. As such, the Government of Ontario has expressed little interest in increasing electricity imports from the United States.